Peter Hitchens has a posting (actually posted 12 December, but I’ve been busy) on the scientific credentials of Darwinism and Intelligent Design. (Now here’s a man I’d like to meet and have coffee with, or beer, or whiskey. It wouldn’t matter: he’s the famous journalist so he’ll be paying, of course!)

I don’t spend too much time worrying about the issue myself. I just don’t believe in the possibility of properly scientific theories of origins. Think about how Darwinism (or even Modern Evolutionary Theory) stands as a theory in comparison with, say, the theory of gravity (take your pick: Classical or Einsteinian), especially when it comes to predictability.

Objects falling to earth accelerate at a rate of 32 feet per second per second. Using that fact we can predict how far a rock will fly if thrown at a horizontal speed of 20 per second. And this is testable because our knowledge of gravity enables us to use mathematical formulae to make these predictions.

Thought experiment: Give a similar prediction utilizing theories of origins such as Darwinism, MET, or even ID.

Unlike the theory of gravity, no theory of origins is testable. As a consequence evolutionists make statements, in response to critiques, which cannot be tested. Take for example an exchange between Hitchens and one of his readers. Hitchens writes:

“Others professed to be puzzled by the distinction between adaptation within species, which is observable and not in dispute, and the Darwinist requirement for far greater changes, such as the development of the eye or the wing, or of the reptile into the bird and the sea-creature into the land creature. How can you not tell the qualitative difference between a moth changing colour, while remaining a moth, and a sea-creature with gills developing legs and lungs and walking on land?” (emphasis mine)

One of his readers offers this reply to the italicized question:

“Peter, the theory of evolution suggests that these are the same thing, or products of the same process. Big changes come about as the result of a series of small changes” (emphasis mine).

Big changes, he argues, come about as a result of a series of small changes. It sounds good; it could even be true. But given that a theory of origins purports to be a theory about the past what he should have said was, “Big changes (like, for example, the ‘big change’ from a sea-creature with gills developing legs and lungs and walking on land) came about as the result of a series of small changes.”

Now, let’s set up an experiment and test that statement. Here’s a prediction: not going to happen. It’s a statement about a probable historical event; and history isn’t done the way science is.

So the answer to Hitchens’ question is that the reason they cannot tell the difference between (a) a moth changing color, while remaining a moth, (b) and a sea-creature with gills developing legs and lungs and walking on land is that there is no qualitative difference between (a) a moth changing color while remaining a moth and (b) a sea-creature with gills developing lungs and walking on land. But if that’s the case then every ‘form’ is a ‘transitional form’, since as we are informed, “Big changes come about as the result of a series of small changes.” Now, if every ‘form’ is a ‘transitional form’ then no ‘form’ is a ‘transitional form’ such that any such form can (a) even be identified as such, much less (b) be used as evidence for evolutionary theory.

What then are we to make of this reader comment?

“To take one of Peter's examples, the transition from reptile to bird is now becoming more fully understood in the light not only of Archaeopteryx but also of feathered dinosaurs from China. Archaeopteryx itself contains features found in reptiles and in modern birds.”

Archaeopteryx is a so-called transitional form. And it is so because it “contains features found in reptiles and in modern birds.” In actuality since, as we’re informed, “Big changes come about as the result of a series of small changes,” Archaeopteryx is no more a transitional form than any other reptile, no more a transitional form than the human race.

Not only that, but the reader’s assertion about Archaeopteryx assumes the very theory he’s arguing for. The reader says that “[T]he transition from reptile to bird is now becoming more fully understood.” Of course this transition cannot be understood if it didn’t take place; and Archaeopteryx is not evidence of the transition taking place. If we are to stick with what we observe, then we must admit that the only thing we observe in Archaeopteryx is a bird with reptilian features, or vice versa. The only way to know that it is a transitional form is to start by knowing that the supposed transition took place. Calling Archaeopteryx a ‘transitional form’ is an act of interpretation, not observation.

Despite my reluctance to think of Darwinism/MET as properly scientific theories I have to concede the one strength they do have; and that is their accord with methodological naturalism. That being said, however, I don’t think that’s much of a strength because I doubt the applicability of methodological naturalism to theories of origins. Methodological naturalism governs the scientific method, the hallmark of which is experimentation.

There is no question, even on the part of theists, that methodological naturalism is an appropriate approach to questions about how the universe (and the life within it) presently operates. But there is some question about whether methodological naturalism is equal to the task of answering questions about how the universe came to be. However the universe came to be, it is. And no experiments are going to be run on it. Not so with questions about how the universe, or the life within it (however it came to be) came to be. It may just be that (a) the origin of the universe and the life within it (or, at least some of the life within it) and (b) the present operation of the universe (including the life within it) are such discreet events, or sets of events, that while methodological naturalism is applicable to the latter it is not applicable to the former. The decision to apply methodological naturalism to the question of origins is a philosophical one, not a scientific one. (And that, incidentally, is why it is a mis-characterisation to claim the dispute between evolutionists and non-evolutionists as a dispute between 'religion' and 'science'. But I digress.)

The only thing, then, that makes evolutionary theories seem to accord with methodological naturalism is the non-theism those theories entail. But given the impossibility of running experiments on origins this accord is superficial. The naturalism behind evolutionary theory (whether Darwinism or MET) is not methodological but ontological naturalism. Evolution is a non-theistic creation myth.

Remember: I also deny the ‘science’ credentials of both ‘Creationism’ and ‘Intelligent Design.’ They are perfectly acceptable metaphysical research programs (which is how Karl Popper characterized evolution), but being, like evolution, unfalsifiable, they suck as scientific theories.