22 February 2007
Belief in God as a pre-rational commitment (1)
10:08 AM
A reply to ‘Q’ (at last)
In his last set of comments Q managed to raise a point which I would be remiss in not dealing with. I’ve been meaning to post this for several days now, but I didn’t want to give the appearance that this blog was going to be a never-ending series of replies to Q. Believing that a sufficient amount of time has elapsed, I want to deal with that point now.
In previous postings (here and here) I asserted that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment. I was responding to Q’s question about the difference between God and the Tooth Fairy, and said, among other things:
[B]elief in god is as much a pre-rational commitment as is belief that rationality is superior to irrationality. Belief in the toothfairy is not ‘properly basic’. I count that as an important difference.
Q responds by saying first:
Toothfairy versus GOD
Both can't be seen. Both can not be perceived in any direct manner. Both seem to do stuff in secret and know things that they couldn't unless they were all seeing and all knowing.
and:
A line such as "belief in god is as much a pre-rational commitment as is belief that rationality is superior to irrationality" doesn't prove a thing. It's an opinion. That's all. More over it's an opinion that draws a conclusion from an equation that is deemed to be correct as a starting point. It translates to : if A is true then B is true to. B is true. Therefor [sic] A is true. E.g.: Belief in the FSM (Ramen) is as much a pre-rational commitment as is belief that all circles are round. See, I just made clear that there's a flying spaghetti monster so you should worship it !
To his first response I say simply that he just can’t be serious. Employing a similar logic I might as well attempt to demonstrate that there’s no difference between an apple and an orange. Observe:
Both have skins. Both have seeds. Both grow on trees.
Wow.
That’s what happens when you try to pass off recitation of superficial similarities as profundity of thought. Clearly, despite similarities, there are important differences between apples and oranges. Q’s recitation of the similarities between God and the Tooth Fairy tells us nothing.
In his second response Q says
1
(a) that my claim that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment (or a basic belief) proves nothing;
(b) that my assertion is a conclusion reached by affirming the consequent (i.e., If A then B. B. Therefore A.); and
2 that he can make clear that there is a Flying Spaghetti Monster merely by asserting that belief in the FSM is a pre-rational commitment.
With respect to both 1 and 2 he is, frankly, way off base. With respect to 1(a) I didn’t say anything was proved by the assertion, only that this truth (i.e., that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment) distinguishes God from the Tooth Fairy. I’m confident of this because, despite what they may tell their children, people who believe in God do not also believe in the Tooth Fairy. (I never told my child there was a Tooth Fairy, or a Santa Claus, or an Easter Bunny and so forth.) If Q thought I was trying to prove something by the assertion that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment then he wasn’t paying attention.
With respect to 1(b) it should be now clear that since I made no argument about belief in God being a pre-rational commitment it simply is not possible for me to have committed the logical fallacy he attributes to me. “Belief in God is a pre-rational commitment” hardly has the form “If A then B. B. Therefore A.”
What I mean by saying that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment is that, however one comes to have such belief, such belief really does not come at the end of a chain of reasoning. Let’s say you have a belief, B5, and that your belief B5 is based on another belief, B4, which in turn is based on your belief B3. You can see that what you have here is layer upon layer of beliefs, which if followed backwards take you back to a fundamental belief which we will call B0 because it is not based on a more fundamental belief. B0 does not come at the end of a chain of reasoning; it is the beginning of a chain of reasoning. B0 is for you a basic belief.
Leaving God aside for a moment (so to speak), an example of a basic belief would, I think, be the belief that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs (beliefs about the nature and purpose of existence, the nature and possibility of knowledge, and of ethics) including belief in the existence of God. Note the nature of this belief. It is hardly a belief for which one could provide evidence. “I believe,” one says, “that people ought to provide evidence for any and all beliefs – beliefs about the nature and purpose of existence, the nature and possibility of knowledge, and of ethics – including belief in the existence of God.”
Clearly there is no positive evidence to support such a claim. A belief like this would be like a belief B0. Not only is it not based on some other, more fundamental belief, it is difficult to see how it could be. Any attempt to justify this belief will assume as true precisely the belief that we are attempting to justify. In other words to say that there must be a belief which serves as the basis for the belief that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs assumes that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs. The belief that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs is therefore basic. This is why I said that the commitment to reason is pre-rational. You can commit to rationality (however you may define it), but you can’t justify that commitment by an appeal to reason.
So, getting back to Q, my saying that belief in God is basic, or a pre-rational commitment, wasn’t intended to prove anything. The question I was answering was not, “What evidence do you have that God exists?” but rather, “What is the difference between God and the Tooth Fairy?” One difference, again, is that belief in God is – at least for some – basic, while belief in the Tooth Fairy is not even seriously entertained by any philosopher with whom I’m familiar, living or dead, much less entertained as a pre-rational commitment, or basic belief. Even children, in my experience, who believe in the Tooth Fairy do not hold that belief as basic. (And children do have basic beliefs.)
I cannot take belief in the Flying Spaghetti Monster as basic, not even to humor Q. The Flying Spaghetti Monster was offered up as, and intended to be, a caricature in response to the Intelligent Design controversy. Its ‘pedigree’ tells us that it is not entertained even as a serious belief, much less a basic one.
Having explained something of what I mean by pre-rational commitment, I owe an explanation for why I hold belief in God as a basic belief and, therefore, a pre-rational commitment. But I’ll have to do offer that explanation a subsequent posting.
In his last set of comments Q managed to raise a point which I would be remiss in not dealing with. I’ve been meaning to post this for several days now, but I didn’t want to give the appearance that this blog was going to be a never-ending series of replies to Q. Believing that a sufficient amount of time has elapsed, I want to deal with that point now.
In previous postings (here and here) I asserted that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment. I was responding to Q’s question about the difference between God and the Tooth Fairy, and said, among other things:
[B]elief in god is as much a pre-rational commitment as is belief that rationality is superior to irrationality. Belief in the toothfairy is not ‘properly basic’. I count that as an important difference.
Q responds by saying first:
Toothfairy versus GOD
Both can't be seen. Both can not be perceived in any direct manner. Both seem to do stuff in secret and know things that they couldn't unless they were all seeing and all knowing.
and:
A line such as "belief in god is as much a pre-rational commitment as is belief that rationality is superior to irrationality" doesn't prove a thing. It's an opinion. That's all. More over it's an opinion that draws a conclusion from an equation that is deemed to be correct as a starting point. It translates to : if A is true then B is true to. B is true. Therefor [sic] A is true. E.g.: Belief in the FSM (Ramen) is as much a pre-rational commitment as is belief that all circles are round. See, I just made clear that there's a flying spaghetti monster so you should worship it !
To his first response I say simply that he just can’t be serious. Employing a similar logic I might as well attempt to demonstrate that there’s no difference between an apple and an orange. Observe:
Both have skins. Both have seeds. Both grow on trees.
Wow.
That’s what happens when you try to pass off recitation of superficial similarities as profundity of thought. Clearly, despite similarities, there are important differences between apples and oranges. Q’s recitation of the similarities between God and the Tooth Fairy tells us nothing.
In his second response Q says
1
(a) that my claim that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment (or a basic belief) proves nothing;
(b) that my assertion is a conclusion reached by affirming the consequent (i.e., If A then B. B. Therefore A.); and
2 that he can make clear that there is a Flying Spaghetti Monster merely by asserting that belief in the FSM is a pre-rational commitment.
With respect to both 1 and 2 he is, frankly, way off base. With respect to 1(a) I didn’t say anything was proved by the assertion, only that this truth (i.e., that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment) distinguishes God from the Tooth Fairy. I’m confident of this because, despite what they may tell their children, people who believe in God do not also believe in the Tooth Fairy. (I never told my child there was a Tooth Fairy, or a Santa Claus, or an Easter Bunny and so forth.) If Q thought I was trying to prove something by the assertion that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment then he wasn’t paying attention.
With respect to 1(b) it should be now clear that since I made no argument about belief in God being a pre-rational commitment it simply is not possible for me to have committed the logical fallacy he attributes to me. “Belief in God is a pre-rational commitment” hardly has the form “If A then B. B. Therefore A.”
What I mean by saying that belief in God is a pre-rational commitment is that, however one comes to have such belief, such belief really does not come at the end of a chain of reasoning. Let’s say you have a belief, B5, and that your belief B5 is based on another belief, B4, which in turn is based on your belief B3. You can see that what you have here is layer upon layer of beliefs, which if followed backwards take you back to a fundamental belief which we will call B0 because it is not based on a more fundamental belief. B0 does not come at the end of a chain of reasoning; it is the beginning of a chain of reasoning. B0 is for you a basic belief.
Leaving God aside for a moment (so to speak), an example of a basic belief would, I think, be the belief that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs (beliefs about the nature and purpose of existence, the nature and possibility of knowledge, and of ethics) including belief in the existence of God. Note the nature of this belief. It is hardly a belief for which one could provide evidence. “I believe,” one says, “that people ought to provide evidence for any and all beliefs – beliefs about the nature and purpose of existence, the nature and possibility of knowledge, and of ethics – including belief in the existence of God.”
Clearly there is no positive evidence to support such a claim. A belief like this would be like a belief B0. Not only is it not based on some other, more fundamental belief, it is difficult to see how it could be. Any attempt to justify this belief will assume as true precisely the belief that we are attempting to justify. In other words to say that there must be a belief which serves as the basis for the belief that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs assumes that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs. The belief that positive evidence must be presented for any and all beliefs is therefore basic. This is why I said that the commitment to reason is pre-rational. You can commit to rationality (however you may define it), but you can’t justify that commitment by an appeal to reason.
So, getting back to Q, my saying that belief in God is basic, or a pre-rational commitment, wasn’t intended to prove anything. The question I was answering was not, “What evidence do you have that God exists?” but rather, “What is the difference between God and the Tooth Fairy?” One difference, again, is that belief in God is – at least for some – basic, while belief in the Tooth Fairy is not even seriously entertained by any philosopher with whom I’m familiar, living or dead, much less entertained as a pre-rational commitment, or basic belief. Even children, in my experience, who believe in the Tooth Fairy do not hold that belief as basic. (And children do have basic beliefs.)
I cannot take belief in the Flying Spaghetti Monster as basic, not even to humor Q. The Flying Spaghetti Monster was offered up as, and intended to be, a caricature in response to the Intelligent Design controversy. Its ‘pedigree’ tells us that it is not entertained even as a serious belief, much less a basic one.
Having explained something of what I mean by pre-rational commitment, I owe an explanation for why I hold belief in God as a basic belief and, therefore, a pre-rational commitment. But I’ll have to do offer that explanation a subsequent posting.
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About Me
- James Frank Solís
- Former soldier (USA). Graduate-level educated. Married 26 years. Texas ex-patriate. Ruling elder in the Presbyterian Church in America.
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